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Abstract—In this paper, we consider game problems played
by (multi)-integrator agents, subject to external disturbances. We
propose Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics based on gradient-
play, augmented with a dynamic internal-model based compo-
nent, which is a reduced-order observer of the disturbance.
We consider single-, double- and extensions to multi-integrator
agents, in a partial-information setting, where agents have only
partial knowledge on the others’ decisions over a network. The
lack of global information is offset by each agent maintaining
an estimate of the others’ states, based on local communication
with its neighbours. Each agent has an additional dynamic
component that drives its estimates to the consensus subspace.
In all cases, we show convergence to the Nash equilibrium
irrespective of disturbances. Our proofs leverage input-to-state
stability under strong monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient and
Lipschitz continuity of the extended pseudo-gradient.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory has found many applications in multi-agent
engineering problems, wherein each agent can be modelled as
an independent, selfish decision maker that tries to optimize its
individual, but coupled, cost function. These include wireless
communication networks [1], [2], [3], optical networks [4],
[5], smart-grid and PEV charging [6], [7], [8] noncooperative
flow control [9], [10] and multi-agent formation problems[11].
The relevant equilibrium sought is the Nash equilibrium (NE),
whereby no agent has incentive to unilaterally change its
action. The objective is to design either continuous-time or
discrete-time, distributed learning schemes that converge to the
NE under reasonable assumptions on the game properties and
agent knowledge. Most works focus on algorithms for agents
that either do not have dynamics, or have single integrator
dynamics, and disturbances are not explicitly considered, [12].
There are many scenarios when the game or the agents
are subject to disturbances, noise or uncertainties. Examples
are demand-side management in smart-grids, with changes
in the energy consumption demand, [6], feedback control
for PEV charging load allocation, [8], or power control for
optical-signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) in the presence of pilot
tones, [13]. Yet there have been relatively few works on Nash
equilibrium seeking in such settings. In [8], a time-varying
pricing function that affects the cost functions of each agent
is considered. Only robustness to the time-varying component
is investigated. Another good motivating example is the case
of a group of mobile robots in a sensor network, similar to
the examples in [14]. Each agent in the network has a goal
related to its global position. However, it must also consider
its position relative to the other agents in the network in
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order to make sure that it maintains communication with its
neighbours. This can easily be formulated as a game played by
the robots, which can be modelled as higher-order agents. In
addition, each robot may be subject to a disturbance, e.g., wind
or a slope in the terrain. It is important that these robots be able
to reject this deterministic disturbance and still converge to the
NE. A similar problem without disturbances was presented in
[15], however the state space is discretized and the game is
treated as a finite action game. This formulation ignores the
dynamics of the individual agents.
Motivated by the above, in this paper our focus is to
extend these results to games wherein the agents are modelled
as (multi)-integrator systems subject to external determinis-
tic disturbances. This is related to NE seeking with noisy
feedback, on which there has been recent work. A dual-
averaging algorithm with noisy gradients is considered in
[16]. A discrete-time extremum seeking algorithm with noisy
cost measurements for agents modelled as single and double
integrators and kinematic unicycles is investigated in [14].
In both of these papers, the noise involved is stochastic in
nature instead of a deterministic disturbance, as we consider
here. Separately, NE seeking in the special class of aggregative
games for Euler-Lagrange systems has been recently investi-
gated in [17], which is similar to our work due to the dynamic
nature of the agents involved, but without disturbances being
considered.
Our work is related to the literature on disturbance rejection
and tracking in multi-agent systems, [18], [19], [20], [21], [22].
Most output regulation problems in multi-agent systems can
be viewed as specific cases of game theoretical problems. The
synchronization problem, for example, can be regarded as a
special game where each agent’s cost function is quadratic and
corresponds to the sum of the squared distances to all of its
neighbours.
Our work is also related to distributed optimization, where a
group of agents cooperatively minimize a global cost function,
the sum of the agents’ individual cost functions. Optimization
schemes that reject disturbances have been discussed for single
integrator systems [23], systems with unit relative degree [24]
and systems with double integrator dynamics [25]. In [26]
the robustness of a continuous-time distributed optimization
algorithm is analyzed in the presence of additively persistent
noise on agents’ communication and computation, in a directed
communication graph. Key differences from a game setup
are the cooperative nature of the problem and the fact that
usually each agent’s cost is decoupled of the others’ variables.
Exploiting summability, leads to a set of parallel decoupled
optimization problems, one for each agent and its own cost
function. Even when the overall cost is not separable, due
to its summable structure, one can extend the problem to an
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2augmented space of estimates, where it becomes separable
and convex. In a game context, an agent’s cost is inherently
coupled to the others’ decisions, on which it does not have
control and convexity is only partial.
Contributions. Motivated by the above, in this paper we
consider how to design Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics
that simultaneously reject exogenous disturbances. We con-
sider single and double-integrator agents, i.e., agents that
behave as continuous-time dynamical systems that integrate
their respective inputs, in a partial-information setting, i.e.,
networked regimes where agents may only access the states
of their neighbours. We also discuss extensions to multi-
integrator agents. Unlike multi-agent set stabilization problems
with disturbance rejection, herein the stabilization goal is the
a priori unknown Nash equilibrium of the game, which has to
be reached irrespective of disturbances. In all cases, we make
standard assumptions that provide existence and uniqueness of
the NE of the game.
Due to the partial-information setting, we inspire from the
disturbance-free results in [27]. Each player keeps track of an
estimate of the others’ decisions as in [27], and the problem
can be seen as one of multi-agent agreement with disturbance
rejection. The agreement subspace is the estimate-consensus
subspace at the Nash equilibrium, irrespective of the distur-
bance. The proposed agent learning dynamics has two com-
ponents: a gradient-play with estimate consensus component
(that drives each player’s dynamics towards minimizing its
own cost function) and a dynamic internal-model component,
which effectively implements a reduced-order observer of the
disturbance. Unlike typical multi-agent agreement, [18], [19],
[21], we cannot use individual passivity of each agent. Rather,
our proofs rely on combining input-to-state stability with
design of a reduced-observer for disturbance, under strong
monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient and Lipschitz continuity
of the extended pseudo-gradient. The resulting agent dynamics
are locally distributed, with coupling introduced only through
the communication graph.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give
the necessary background on nonlinear systems, graph theory
and noncooperative game theory. In Section III, we formulate
the NE seeking problem for dynamic agents with disturbance
rejection. In Section IV, we give our results for NE seeking dy-
namics with disturbance rejection for single-integrator agents.
In Section V, we formulate a NE seeking algorithm for double-
integrator agents and discuss extensions to multi-integrator
agents. In Section VI, we compare by simulation their per-
formance with those of a standard gradient-play dynamics and
an augmented gradient-play dynamics with estimate consensus
(partial information setting), and give conclusions in Section
VII. A short version of this work appeared in [28], where only
single-integrators are treated.
Notations. Let R, R≥0 denote the set of real and non-
negative real numbers, C and C− the set of complex numbers
and complex numbers with negative real part. Given x, y∈Rn,
xT y denotes the inner product of x and y. Let ‖·‖ :Rn→R≥0
denote the Euclidean norm and ‖ · ‖ :Rm×n→R≥0 denote the
induced matrix norm. col(x1, . . . , xN ) denotes [xT1 , . . . , x
T
N ]
T .
Given matrices A1, . . . , AN , blkdiag(A1, . . . , AN ) denotes
the block diagonal matrix with Ai on the diagonal. In denotes
the n×n identity matrix. 1n denotes the n×1 all ones vector.
A⊗B denotes the Kronecker product of matrices A and B.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Input to State Stability
In this work, we model the dynamics of each agent as a
continuous time dynamical system. We first introduce some
background from [29]. Consider a nonlinear system,
x˙ = f(x, u) (1)
where x˙ := dx(t)dt , f :R
n×Rm→Rn is locally Lipschitz in x
and u and the input u(t) is a piecewise continuous, bounded
function.
Definition 1: System (1) is input-to-state stable (ISS) if
there exist β ∈ KL and γ ∈ K such that for any initial state
x(t0) and any bounded input u(t), the solution x(t) satisfies
‖x(t)‖ ≤ β(‖x(t0)‖, t− t0) + γ
(
sup
to≤τ≤t
‖u(τ)‖
)
, ∀t ≥ t0
Theorem 1: (Theorem 4.19, [29]) Let V (x) be a continu-
ously differentiable function such that
α1(‖x‖) ≤ V (x) ≤ α2(‖x‖)
∂V
∂x
f(x, u) ≤ −W (x), ∀‖x‖ ≥ ρ(‖u‖) > 0
∀x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, where α1, α2 ∈ K∞,ρ ∈ K, and W (x) is
positive definite. Then system (1) is ISS with γ=α−11 ◦α2◦ρ.
Consider now the cascade of two systems
x˙1 = f1(x1, x2) (2)
x˙2 = f2(x2) (3)
with f1 :Rn1×Rn2→Rn1 , f2 :Rn2→Rn2 locally Lipschitz.
Lemma 1: (Lemma 4.7, [29]) If the system (2) with x2 as
an input is ISS and the origin of (3) is globally uniformly
asymptotically stable, then the origin of the cascade system
(2) and (3) is globally uniformly asymptotically stable.
B. Graph Theory
In this paper, we consider NE seeking for dynamic agents
with communication over networks with fixed (static) topol-
ogy. The communication protocol relies on graph theory. The
following is from [30]. An undirected graph, G is a pair
G = (I, E) where I = {1, . . . , N} is the vertex set and
E ⊂ I × I is the edge set. Since G is an undirected graph,
for all i, j ∈ I, if (i, j) ∈ E then (j, i) ∈ E. Let Ni ⊂ I
denote the set of neighbours of player i. The adjacency matrix
A = [aij ] ∈ RN×N of the graph G is defined such that aij = 1
if (j, i) ∈ E and aij = 0 otherwise. For an an undirected
graph, aij = aji. G is connected if any two agents are
connected by a path. The Laplacian matrix L = [lij ] ∈ RN×N
of the graph G is defined as lii =
∑
j 6=i aij = |Ni| and
lij = −aij , for i 6= j. For an undirected and connected
graph, L is symmetric positive definite and has a simple zero
eigenvalue such that 0 < λ2(L) ≤ . . . ≤ λN (L) and L1N = 0.
Furthermore, for any vector y ∈ RN satisfying 1TNy = 0,
λ2(L)‖y‖2 ≤ yTLy ≤ λN (L)‖y‖2.
3C. Game Theory
Consider a set of players, I = {1, . . . , N}. Each player
i ∈ I controls its own action xi ∈ Ωi ⊂ Rni . The overall
action set of the players is Ω = Ω1 × · · · × ΩN ⊂ Rn, where
n =
∑
i∈I ni. Let x = (xi, x−i) ∈ Ω denote the overall action
profile of all players, where x−i ∈ Ω−i = Ω1 × · · · ×Ωi−1 ×
Ωi+1×· · ·×ΩN ⊂ Rn−i is the action set of all players except
for player i. Let Ji : Ω → R be the cost function of player
i. Each player tries to minimize its own cost function over its
action. Denote the game G(I, Ji,Ωi).
Definition 2: Given a game G(I, Ji,Ωi), an action profile
x∗ = (x∗i , x
∗
−i) ∈ Ω is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of G if
Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(xi, x∗−i) ∀i ∈ I, ∀xi ∈ Ωi
At a Nash Equilibrium no player can unilaterally decrease its
cost, and thus has no incentive to switch strategies (actions)
on its own.
Assumption 1: For each i ∈ I, let Ωi = Rni , the cost
function Ji : Ω → R be C1 in its arguments and convex
in xi.
Under Assumption 1, any NE satisfies
∇iJi(x∗i , x∗−i) = 0, ∀i ∈ I (4)
where ∇iJi(xi, x−i) = ∂∂xi Ji(xi, x−i) ∈ Rni is the partial
gradient of player i’s cost function, with respect to its own
action. We denote the set of all NE in the game by
ΓNE =
{
x ∈ Rn|∇iJi(xi, x−i) = 0, ∀i ∈ I
}
(5)
Let F (x) = col(∇1J1(x), . . . ,∇NJN (x)) denote the pseudo-
gradient- the stacked vector of all partial gradients, so (4) is
F (x∗) = 0
Assumption 2: The pseudo-gradient F : Ω → Rn is
strongly monotone, (x− x′)T (F (x)− F (x′)) > µ||x− x′||2,
∀x, x′ ∈ Rn for µ > 0 and Lipschitz continuous, ||F (x) −
F (x′)|| ≤ θ||x− x′||, θ > 0.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, by Theorem 3 in [31], the game
has a unique NE.
D. Full-Information Gradient Dynamics
In the rest of this paper, we assume that each agent updates
its action in a continuous manner, therefore xi = xi(t).
For simplicity of notation, we drop the explicit dependence
on time. In a game with perfect information, i.e., complete
communication graph, a gradient-based NE seeking algorithm
(gradient-play) can be used for action update, given by
Σi : x˙i = −∇iJi(xi, x−i), ∀i ∈ I (6)
We call Σi the agent learning dynamics, and note that it
requires full decision information of the others’, x−i.
The game can be visualized as an interconnection between
all agents’ learning dynamics, Σi, i ∈ I, represented as in
Fig. 1, where Σ−i denote the other agents’ learning dynamics
(except i), and s−i is the information received by agent i
from the others Σ−i in continuous-time. Hence, in the full
information setting, s−i = x−i. With (6), the overall dynamics
of all players, Σ = (Σi,Σ−i) is Σ : x˙ = −F (x). Note that
Σ can be viewed as a feedback interconnection between a
Σi
G
Σ−i
sis−i
xi
x−i
Fig. 1: Game as an interconnection between agents’ dynamics
bank of integrators with the pseudo-gradient map F . Under
Assumption 1, the solutions of (6) exist and are unique for
any initial condition, x(0). Under Assumption 2, the unique
Nash Equilibrium of the game is globally asymptotically stable
for the interconnected Σ, with Σi as in (6), (cf. [32] or Lemma
1, [27]).
E. Partial-Information Gradient Dynamics
Often only partial information is available to each agent, i.e.,
from the neighbours of each agent. In this case, a modified
algorithm must be used, where agent i uses estimates, xi,
which it shares with its neighbours, and evaluates its gradient
using these estimates instead of the others’ actions. Referring
to Fig. 1, in this case, s−i = {xj |j ∈ Ni}. The following is
from [27]. Consider a game with information exchanged over a
network, with static communication graph, Gc and Laplacian,
L.
Assumption 3: The undirected graph Gc is connected.
Consider the following agent learning dynamics
Σi :
{
x˙i−i = −Si
∑
j∈Ni(x
i − xj)
x˙i = −∇iJi(xi, xi−i)−Ri
∑
j∈Ni(x
i − xj), ∀i ∈ I
(7)
where xi−i are agent i’s estimates of the others actions.
Based on local communication with its neighbours, Ni,
each agent i computes estimates of all other agents’ ac-
tions, xi−i = col(xi1, . . . , xii−1, xii+1, . . . , xiN ) ∈ Rn−i and
uses these estimates to evaluate its gradient, ∇iJi(xi, xi−i).
Then, xi = col(xi1, . . . , xii−1, xi, xii+1, . . . , xiN ) ∈ Rn and x =
col(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈RNn. The matrices Ri and Si are defined
as follows
Ri :=
[
0ni×n<i Ini 0ni×n>i
]
Si :=
[
In<i 0n<i×ni 0n<i×n>i
0n>i×n<i 0n>i×ni In>i
]
(8)
for actions and estimates selection, where n<i :=∑
j<i j,i∈I nj and n>i :=
∑
j>i j,i∈I nj . Then xi = Rixi,
xi−i = Sixi, and xi = RTi xi + STi xi−i. Note that,
RTi Ri + STi Si = In, ∀i ∈ I (9)
The vector of stacked, partial gradients ∇iJi(xi, xi−i) in (7),
computed based on estimates, is denoted as
F(x) = col(∇1J1(x1, x1−1), . . . ,∇NJN (xN , xN−N )). (10)
and is called the extended pseudo-gradient. Note that F satis-
fies F(1N ⊗ x) = F (x) for any x, hence
F(1N ⊗ x∗) = 0 (11)
Assumption 4: F is Lipschitz continuous, ||F(x)−F(x′)|| ≤
θ||x− x′||, for all x, x′ ∈ RNn, for some θ > 0.
4Under Assumptions 1- 4, if µ(λ2(L) − θ) > θ2, the unique
NE, x = x∗, is globally asymptotically stable for all networked
interconnected Σi, (7), (cf. Theorem 1, [27]).
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider the problem of NE seeking for
multi-integrator agents in the presence of additive disturbance
signals. The dynamics of each agent can be modelled by the
following linear system, of order ri ≥ 1
x
(ri)
i = ui + di, ∀i ∈ I (12)
where x(ri)i :=
drixi(t)
dtri . Each agent has a cost function
Ji(xi, x−i) that it seeks to minimize. Agent i is affected by
disturbance, di, which can be modelled as being generated by
Di :
{
w˙i = Siwi, wi(0) ∈ Wi, ∀i ∈ I
di = Diwi
(13)
where wi ∈ Rqi , di ∈ Rni . We assume that Wi a compact
subset set of Rqi and that Di is marginally (neutrally) stable
and observable, [33]. Let W =W1 × · · · ×WN . This setting
is motivated by cases where the agents in the game have
inherent dynamics. This occurs, for example, in the case of a
game played between a network of velocity-actuated (single-
integrator) or force-actuated (double-integrator) robots whose
costs depend upon their position only. The disturbances are
the result of a deterministic effect from the physical nature
of the systems, e.g., wind pushing the mobile robots. These
disturbances have known form (e.g., constant) but unknown
parameters (e.g., strength). Therefore, we assume that each
agent knows its Si and Di only, but has no knowledge of
the initial condition wi(0) ∈ Wi or the resulting solution
wi(t). These are standard assumptions in the output regulation
literature. Now the problem becomes one of finding control
inputs, ui, that minimize the cost function Ji(xi, x−i) while
simultaneously rejecting the disturbances, i.e., designing dy-
namics Σi, under which the NE x∗ is asymptotically stable
for the closed-loop irrespective of disturbances (Fig. 2). We
consider separately the single-integrator agents (Section IV)
and double-integrator agents (Section V), and indicate how to
extend the results to multi-integrator agents.
Σi
G
Σ−i
di
d−i
sis−i
xi
x−i
Fig. 2: Game with disturbances on the dynamics of each agent
In each case we consider a partial-decision information
setting, under local knowledge and communication over a
graph Gc. We will show that if each player uses a gradient-play
dynamics combined with an internal-model correction term
that implements a reduced order observer for wi, [34], (and a
consensus-based dynamics), then every solution of the stacked
dynamics of all agents stays bounded and will converge to the
NE, x∗, irrespective of disturbances w ∈ W .
IV. NE SEEKING FOR SINGLE-INTEGRATOR AGENTS
In this section, we consider a game G where each agent is
modelled as
x˙i = ui + di, ∀i ∈ I (14)
where di is generated by (13), as in the example of a network
of velocity actuated robots, and has a cost Ji(xi, x−i), which
it seeks to minimize while rejecting disturbances. We consider
that each agent has partial (networked) information from his
neighbours over graph, Gc.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the game has a unique NE.
Inspired by (7), our proposed ui is dynamic and is generated
by
x˙i−i = −Si
∑
j∈Ni
(xi − xj)
ξ˙i = Si(Kixi + ξi) +Ki∇iJi(xi, xi−i)
+KiRi
∑
j∈Ni
(xi − xj)
ui = −∇iJi(xi, xi−i)−Ri
∑
j∈Ni
(xi − xj)
−Di(Kixi + ξi), ∀i ∈ I (15)
where Ki is chosen such that σ(Si − KiDi) ⊂ C−. Note
that (15) has a gradient-play term (evaluated at estimates)
as well as a dynamic component ξ˙i to reject disturbances,
combined with a dynamic Laplacian-based estimate-consensus
component x˙i−i, which in steady-state should bring all xi to
the consensus subspace, xi = xj . This leads to Σi given by,
Σi :

x˙i = −∇iJi(xi, xi−i)−Ri
∑
j∈Ni(x
i − xj)
−Di(Kixi + ξi) + di
x˙i−i = −Si
∑
j∈Ni(x
i − xj)
ξ˙i = Si(Kixi + ξi) +Ki∇iJi(xi, xi−i)
+KiRi
∑
j∈Ni(x
i − xj), ∀i ∈ I
(16)
Compared to (7), (16) has an extra-component, ξi, that acts an
internal model for the disturbance. The following result shows
convergence to the NE irrespective of disturbances.
Theorem 2: Consider a game G(I, Ji,Ωi) with partial in-
formation over a graph Gc with Laplacian L and agent learning
dynamics Σi, (16), where disturbance di is as in (13). Under
Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, if µ(λ2(L) − θ) > θ2, then
x¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗, where x∗ is the unique NE, is globally
asymptotically stable for all networked interconnected Σis,
(16), for all w ∈ W . Moreover, all players’ estimates converge
globally to x¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗, for all w ∈ W .
Proof: The idea of the proof is to express all agents’
interconnected dynamics as a closed-loop dynamical system
for which the NE is shown to be globally asymptotically stable
irrespective of disturbances. To show stability we use a suitable
change of coordinates to put the system in cascade form. Then
we exploit ISS properties induced by strong monotonicity of
5the pseudo-gradient and Lipschitz continuity of the extended
pseudo-gradient.
In stacked form, using F, (10), (13), all interconnected Σi,
(16), of all agents i ∈ I, can be written as a closed-loop
system
w˙ = Sw
Σ :

x˙ = −F(x)−RLx−D(Kx+ ξ) +Dw
S x˙ = −SLx
ξ˙ = S(Kx+ ξ) +KF(x) +KRLx
(17)
with R=blkdiag(R1, . . .RN ),S=blkdiag(S1 . . .SN ),L=L⊗
IN ,x= col(x1, . . . xN ),col(x1−1, . . . , xN−N)=Sxby xi−i=Sixi.
Consider the coordinate transformation ξ 7→ ρ :=w−(Kx+
ξ), so that ρ˙=(S−KD)ρ. Note that from xi = RTi xi+STi xi−i
it follows that x = RTx+ STSx. Using RTR+STS=INn,
from (9), and the previous relations, it follows that in the new
coordinates, the stacked-form dynamics (17) are given as,
w˙ = Sw
x˙ = −RTF(x)− Lx +RTDρ
ρ˙ = (S −KD)ρ (18)
We note that (18) is in cascade form from ρ to x. By shifting
the coordinates x 7→ x˜ := x − x¯, where x¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗, the
dynamics of the (x˜, ρ) subsystem become
˙˜x = −RTF(x˜ + x¯)− L(x˜ + x¯) +RTDρ
ρ˙ = (S −KD)ρ (19)
Note that (19) is again in cascade form, with the ρ-subsystem
generating the external input for the x˜-subsystem. Consider
V (x˜) = 12‖x˜‖2. Then, along solutions of the x˜-subsystem in
(19), using L¯x = 0Nn, it holds that
V˙ = −x˜T (RT [F(x˜ + x¯) + Lx˜−RTDρ) (20)
Decompose RNn as RNn =Cn⊕En, where Cn = {1N ⊗
x| x∈Rn} is the consensus subspace, and En is its orthogonal
complement. Any x ∈ RNn can be written as x = x⊥+x‖,
where x‖=PCx∈Cn, x⊥=PEx∈En, for PC = 1N 1N⊗1TN⊗In,
PE=INn− 1N 1N⊗1TN⊗In. Thus, x‖=1N⊗x, for some x∈Rn,
and x˜= x− x¯= x˜⊥+ x˜‖, where x˜‖ = 1N⊗(x−x∗), x˜⊥ = x⊥.
Using F(x¯)=0n by (11), from (20) we get
V˙ = −(x˜⊥ + x˜‖)TRT [F(x˜ + x¯)− F(x¯)]
− (x˜⊥+x˜‖)TL(x˜⊥+x˜‖)+(x˜⊥+x˜‖)TRTDρ (21)
Note that Lx˜‖=0Nn and λ2(L)‖x˜⊥‖2≤ x˜⊥Lx˜⊥, ∀x˜⊥∈En by
properties of the Laplacian under Assumption 3. Adding and
subtractingF(x˜‖+¯x) in (21), with F(x˜‖+¯x)=F(1N⊗x)=F (x),
F(x¯)=F(1N ⊗x∗)=F (x∗), and using R(x˜‖)=x−x∗, yields
V˙ ≤ −(x˜⊥)TRT [F(x˜⊥ + x˜‖ + x¯)− F(x˜‖ + x¯)]
− (x˜⊥)TRT [F (x)− F (x∗)]− λ2(L)‖x˜⊥‖2
− (x− x∗)T [F(x˜⊥ + x˜‖ + x¯)− F(x˜‖ + x¯)]
− (x− x∗)T [F (x)− F (x∗)] + (x˜⊥ + x˜‖)TRTDρ
Using ‖F(˜x⊥+x˜‖+x¯)−F(˜x‖+x¯)‖≤ θ‖˜x⊥‖ by Assumption 4,
‖R˜x⊥‖≤‖R‖‖x˜⊥‖, ‖F (x)−F (x∗)‖≤ θ¯‖x−x∗‖≤θ‖x−x∗‖,
(x−x∗)T [F (x)−F (x∗)]≥µ‖x−x∗‖2 by Assumption 2, yields
V˙ ≤ θ‖x˜⊥‖2 + θ‖x˜⊥‖‖x− x∗‖ − λ2(L)‖x˜⊥‖2
+ θ‖x− x∗‖‖x˜⊥‖ − µ‖x− x∗‖2 + (x˜⊥ + x˜‖)TRTDρ
Using ‖x− x∗‖ = 1√
N
‖x˜‖‖, we can write
V˙ ≤ −
[
‖x˜‖‖ ‖x˜⊥‖
] [ 1
N µ − 1√N θ
− 1√
N
θ λ2(L)− θ
] [‖x˜‖‖
‖x˜⊥‖
]
+ ‖x˜⊥ + x˜‖‖‖RTD‖‖ρ‖
Then, given any a > 0, for any ‖x˜⊥ + x˜‖‖ ≥ ‖RTD‖a ‖ρ‖,
V˙ ≤ −
[
‖x˜‖‖ ‖x˜⊥‖
] [ 1
N µ − 1√N θ
− 1√
N
θ λ2(L)− θ
] [‖x˜‖‖
‖x˜⊥‖
]
+ a‖x˜⊥ + x˜‖‖2
Note that ‖x˜⊥ + x˜‖‖2 = ‖x˜⊥‖2 + ‖x˜‖‖2 = ‖x˜‖2, so that, for
any ‖x˜⊥ + x˜‖‖ ≥ ‖RTD‖a ‖ρ‖ we can write,
V˙ ≤−[‖x˜‖‖ ‖x˜⊥‖][ 1N µ− a − 1√N θ− 1√
N
θ λ2(L)− θ − a
][‖x˜‖‖
‖x˜⊥‖
]
(22)
For the x˜-subsystem in (19) to be ISS, we need the matrix on
the right-hand side to be positive definite. This holds for any
a>0 such that a< 1N µ, a<λ2(L)−θ, and ( 1N µ−a)(λ2(L)−
θ−a)− 1N θ2 > 0. Since µ(λ2(L) − θ) > θ2, the intersection
of the above inequalities is guaranteed to be nonempty and
the matrix is positive definite for any such a. Then, for any
such a, V˙ (x˜) ≤ −W (x˜), ∀‖x˜‖ ≥ ‖RTD‖a ‖ρ‖, where W (x˜) is
a positive definite function, hence the x˜-subsystem in (19) is
ISS with respect to ρ by Theorem 1. Since ρ˙=(S−KD)ρ is
asymptotically stable by (16), it follows that the origin of (19)
is asymptotically stable by Lemma 1, hence (1N⊗ x∗, 0) is
asymptotically stable for (18), for any w ∈ W .
Remark 1: Local results follow if Assumption 4 holds only
locally around x∗ = 1N ⊗ x∗. We note that the class of
quadratic games satisfies Assumption 4 globally.
Remark 2: In the special case of full-information, there is
no need for estimates and the agent (closed-loop) learning
dynamics Σi, (16), reduce to,
Σi :
{
x˙i = −∇iJi(xi, x−i)−Di(Kixi + ξi) + di,
ξ˙i = Si(Kixi + ξi) +Ki∇iJi(xi, x−i),
(23)
The convergence result as in Theorem 2 holds without the
need for Assumptions 3 and 4.
V. NE SEEKING FOR DOUBLE INTEGRATORS
In this section, we consider NE seeking for double-
integrator agents with disturbances. Our motivation is two-
fold. Firstly, the agents in the game might have some sort of
inherent dynamics, such as double integrator robots playing
a game wherein the cost functions are functions of their
positions. Each agent, therefore, cannot directly update its
action, xi, via choice of input ui and must take into account
its inherent dynamics. Secondly, we may want to consider
higher-order dynamics for learning, as done extensively in the
optimization literature, e.g., the heavy-ball method.
6Consider that each agent is modelled as a double integrator{
x˙i = vi
v˙i = ui + di
(24)
where xi, vi, ui, di ∈ Rni , di generated by (13). Each agent
minimizes its cost function Ji(xi, x−i), with the constraint
that its steady-state velocity is zero. This setting is motivated
for example in the case of a network of mobile, force-
actuated robots whose costs depend on their positions only.
At steady state, necessarily, their velocities must be zero.
This requirement can be seen as the result of a quadratic
penalty term, Jvi(vi)=
1
2‖vi‖2, on the velocity of each agent.
Thus, the overall cost function for each agent is given by
J¯(xi, x−i, vi)=J(xi, x−i)+ 12‖vi‖2 and the resulting NE is
ΓNE=
{
(x,v)∈Rn×Rn|∇iJi(xi, x−i)=0, vi=0,∀i∈I
}
(25)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, x∗ is unique. By (25), (x∗, v∗)
is such that
F (x∗) = 0, v∗ = 0 (26)
We consider partial-information learning dynamics under
which the NE of the game is reached in the presence of
additive disturbances.
We propose the following dynamic feedback
γ˙i−i= −Si
∑
j∈Ni
(γi − γj)
ξ˙i= Si(Kivi + ξi) +Ki∇iJi(xi + bivi,γi−i)
+Ki
( 1
bi
vi +Ri
∑
j∈Ni
(γi − γj)
)
ui=−∇iJi(xi + bivi,γ−i)−
1
bi
vi
−Ri
∑
j∈Ni
(γi−γj)−Di(Kivi+ξi) (27)
where Ki is such that σ(Si−KiDi)⊂C− and bi>0 and γi is
agent i’s estimate variable. Note that in ∇iJi is evaluated at a
predicted point, xi + bivi. We denote γij agent i’s prediction
of xj+bjvj . (27) uses a similar internal model and Laplacian-
based consensus scheme (15), as in Section IV. However,
instead of each agent estimating the others’ actions, x−i, they
estimate the predicted actions {xj + bjvj |j ∈ I, j 6= i} used
to evaluate the gradient at the predicted point. Each agent will
then share these estimates as well as their own prediction with
their neighbours. Therefore, each agent i computes γi−i =
col(γi1, . . . ,γ
i
i−1,γ
i
i+1, . . . ,γ
i
N ) ∈ Rn−i and uses these es-
timates when evaluating its gradient, ∇iJi(xi + bivi,γi−i).
Intuitively, each agent makes a prediction on the future state of
the game,xi+bivi, based on the current actions and velocities,
and evaluates its gradient with respect to xi at this point. We
denote γi = col(γi1, . . . ,γ
i
i−1, xi+ bivi,γ
i
i+1, . . . ,γ
i
N ) ∈ Rn
and γ = col(γ1, . . . ,γN ) ∈ RNn.
Remark 3: From an agent perspective, the intuition be-
hind (27) is that each agent evaluates its partial-gradient
at a predicted future point, xi + bivi, obtained as a first-
order prediction from the current action and velocity of each
agent, with a negative feedback on its velocity. This can be
viewed as resulting from the quadratic penalty term associ-
ated with the velocity of each agent. In addition, consider
the disturbance-free case and recall that gradient-play is a
method that works well for single-integrators, i.e., systems
with unit relative degree. By creating a fictitious output γii :
= xi + bivi we decrease the relative degree of each agent
to {1, . . . , 1}. This creates a hyperplane x + Bv − x∗ = 0,
where B = blkdiag(b1In1 , . . . , bNInN ), on which the pseudo-
gradient map is zero. The pseudo-gradient feedback makes
this hyperplane attractive for the double-integrator system.
The feedback stabilizes v = 0 and renders this hyperplane
invariant, thereby stabilizing x = x∗.
Remark 4: We note that (27) is similar to a passivity-based
group coordination design, e.g., [35]. Indeed, the inner-loop
feedback ui = − 1bi vi renders the agent dynamics passive with
γii = xi+bivi as output. However, we stress that the feedback
∇iJi(xi + bivi,γ−i) is not necessarily the proper gradient of
any function, as required in [35]. Therefore, individually, each
agent is not a passive system when the feedback is added,
due to coupling to the others’ actions via the cost function.
This precludes using a passivity approach as in [35]. Rather,
here we use a combined ISS approach to deal with both the
disturbance and the higher-order stabilization.
The choice of feedback (27) yields learning (closed-loop)
dynamics given by
Σi :

γ˙i−i = −Si
∑
j∈Ni(γ
i − γj), ∀i ∈ I
x˙i = vi
v˙i =−∇iJi(xi + bivi,γ−i)− 1bi vi
−Ri
∑
j∈Ni(γ
i−γj)−Di(Kivi+ξi)+di
ξ˙i = Si(Kivi + ξi) +Ki∇iJi(xi + bivi,γi−i)
+Ki
(
1
bi
vi +Ri
∑
j∈Ni(γ
i − γj)
)
(28)
Theorem 3: Consider a game G(I, Ji,Rni) with partial
information over a graph Gc with Laplacian L and learning
dynamics Σi, (28), where disturbance di is generated by (13).
Under Assumptions 1-4, if µ(λ2(L)−θ)>θ2 then 1N ⊗ x∗,
where x∗ is the unique NE, is globally asymptotically stable
for all networked interconnected Σi, for all w ∈ W . Moreover,
each player’s estimates converge globally to the NE value,
γ¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗.
Proof: The idea of the proof is similar to that of Theorem
2. We use a change of coordinates to express the closed-loop
dynamics in cascade form and use ISS arguments the show
stability of the NE for the overall cascade system, irrespective
of disturbance. The difference lies in the fact that (28) has
extra terms due to the higher-order dynamics v˙i that must be
incorporated into the cascade.
The stacked dynamics of (28) is given by
w˙=Sw
Σ :

Sγ˙=−SLγ
x˙=v
v˙=−B−1v−F(γ)−RLγ−D(Kv+ξ)+Dw
ξ˙=S(Kv + ξ) +K(F(γ) + B−1v +RLγ)
(29)
Note that Rγ = [Riγi]i∈I = [xi + bivi]i∈I = x + Bv. Let
the coordinate transformation x 7→ Rγ :=x+Bv. Then,
Rγ˙ = −BF(γ)− BRLγ − BD(Kv + ξ − w).
7Combining this with the second equation in (29), by using the
properties of R and S, RTR+ STS = I , yields that
γ˙=−RTBF(γ)−(RTBR+STS)Lγ
Let ξ 7→ ρ :=w− (Kv+ξ), so that ρ˙ = (S−KD)ρ. Consider
also γ 7→ γ˜ := γ − γ¯. Then, in the new coordinates, using
Lγ¯ = 0, the dynamics of the (γ˜, v, ρ) are given by
v˙ = −B−1v − F(γ˜ + γ¯)−RLγ˜ +Dρ (30)
˙˜γ=−RTBF(γ˜+γ¯)−(RTBR+STS)Lγ˜+RTBDρ (31)
ρ˙ = (S −KD)ρ (32)
Note that the (30-32) is in cascade form with subsystem (γ˜, ρ)
(31, 32) generating the external input for (30). In turn, (31,
32) is in cascade form with (32) generating input ρ for (31).
We show first that (31) is ISS with respect to ρ. Consider
V (γ˜) =
1
2
γ˜TRTB−1Rγ˜ + 1
2
γ˜TSTSγ˜ (33)
which is positive definite. Taking the time-derivative of V (33)
along the solutions of (31), using F(γ¯) = 0, cf. (11), and
properties of R, S, e.g. RST = 0, RRT = I , yields
V˙ =−γ˜TRTB−1(BF(˜γ+γ¯)+BRLγ˜−BDρ)− γ˜TSTSLγ˜
= −γ˜T (RTF(γ˜ + γ¯) + Lγ˜ −RTDρ)
which is similar to (20). Then, following an argument as in
the proof of Theorem 2, it follows that the γ˜ subsystem of
(31) is ISS with input ρ. Since the origin of the ρ subsystem
is globally asymptotically stable, then the origin of the (γ˜, ρ)
subsystem is globally asymptotically stable (cf. Lemma 1).
Now consider the v-subsystem (30) with input (γ˜, ρ) and
V2(v) =
1
2‖v‖2. Along (30), using Assumption 2,
V˙2 = −vTB−1(v)− vT (F(γ˜ + γ¯) +RLγ˜ −Dρ)
≤− 1
bm
‖v‖2+‖v‖‖F(˜γ+γ¯)‖+ ‖v‖‖RLγ˜‖+ ‖v‖‖D‖‖ρ‖
≤ − 1
bm
‖v‖2 + β‖v‖(‖ρ‖+ ‖γ˜‖)
where bm=maxi∈I bi, β=max{‖RL‖+θ, ‖D‖}. Thus V˙2 ≤
− 1bm ‖v‖2 + β‖v‖
√
2(‖ρ‖2 + ‖γ˜‖2) or,
V˙2 ≤ − 1
bm
‖v‖2 +
√
2β‖v‖‖u˜‖.
where u˜ := col(γ˜, ρ). Hence, V˙2 ≤−
(
1
bm
−b)‖v‖2, ∀‖v‖ ≥√
2β
b ‖u˜‖, for any 0< b< 1bm . Therefore, by Theorem 1, (30)
is ISS with u˜ = (γ˜, ρ). Since the origin of (γ˜, ρ) subsystem
is globally asymptotically stable, by Lemma 1, the origin of
(31)-(32) is globally asymptotically stable, hence (x∗, 0) is
globally asymptotically stable for (29) for all w ∈ W .
Remark 5: In the full information case, there is no need for
estimate and (28) reduces to
Σi:

x˙i =vi
v˙i =−∇iJi(xi+bivi,x−i+b−iv−i)− 1bi vi−Di(Kivi+ξi)+di
ξ˙i =Si(Kivi+ξ)+Ki
(∇iJi(xi+bivi,x−i+b−iv−i)+ 1bi vi)
(34)
The convergence results hold without the need for Assump-
tions 3 and 4. Furthermore, the disturbance-free, higher-order
learning dynamics generated by (34) is
x¨+ B−1x˙+ F (x+ Bx˙) = 0
which resembles heavy-ball with friction dynamics used in
optimization, [36], [37].
Remark 6: The results from this section can easily be
extended to multi-integrator agents. Consider that each agent
is modelled as a rthi order integrator, ri≥2,
x˙i = Civi
v˙i = Aivi +Bi(ui + di), ∀i ∈ I
where Ai =
[
0ni(ri−2)×ni Ini(ri−2)
0ni×ni 0ni×ni(ri−2)
]
, Bi =
[
0ni(ri−2)×ni
Ini
]
,
Ci =
[
Ini 0ni×ni(ri−2)
]
, vi = col(v1i , . . . , v
ri−1
i ), and has
a cost function Ji(xi, x−i). In this case, γi := xi +[
cTi ⊗Ini Ini
]
vi where cTi =
[
ci,1 . . . ci,(ri−2)
]
, ci,k are
the coefficients of any (ri− 1)th order Hurwitz polynomial
with ci,0 = 1, ci,(ri−1) = 1, and ui := −∇iJi(γi,γi−i)−[
Ini c
T
i ⊗Ini
]
vi. When ri = 2, this feedback reduces to the
one for the second-order integrator with bi = 1. Then a
dynamic learning scheme similar to (28) can be developed, by
appropriately augmenting with reduced-order observer for the
disturbance, and consensus-dynamics for the estimates γi−i.
The resulting agent learning dynamics are given as
Σi :

γ˙i−i = −Si
∑
j∈Ni(γ
i − γj)
x˙i = Civi
v˙i = Aivi −Bi
(
∇iJi(γi,γ−i) +
[
Ini c
T
i ⊗Ini
]
vi
+Ri
∑
j∈Ni(γ
i − γj)−Diw
+Di(Kiv
ri−1
i + ξi)
)
ξ˙i = Si(Kiv
ri−1
i + ξi) +Ki
(
∇iJi(γii,γi−i)
+Ri
∑
j∈Ni(γ
i − γj) +
[
Ini c
T
i ⊗Ini
]
vi
)
(35)
which for ri = 2 reduces to (28).
Theorem 4: Consider a game G(I, Ji,Ωi) with partial in-
formation communicated over a graph Gc with Laplacian L
and agent dynamics given by Σi, (35). Under Assumptions 1,
2, 3 and 4, if µ(λ2(L)−θ) > θ2 then the unique NE, x = x∗,
is globally asymptotically stable for (35) for all w ∈ W .
Moreover, each player’s estimates converge globally to the
NE values, x¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗, for all w ∈ W .
Proof: Similar to Theorem 3.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we consider two application scenarios: an
optical network OSNR game and a sensor network game.
In both examples, our algorithms are compared with the
full and partial-information gradient-play in the presence of
disturbances.
A. OSNR Game
Consider an optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) model for
wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) links [4], where 10
channels, I = {1, . . . , 10}, are transmitted over an optically
amplified link. We consider each channel as an agent and
denote each agent’s transmitting power as xi, while the noise
power of each channel as n0i . Each agent attempts to maximize
its OSNR on its channel by adjusting its transmission power.
Each agent has a cost function as in [38], given by
8Ji(xi, x−i)=aixi+
1
P 0−∑j∈Ixj−biln
(
1+ci
xi
n0i +
∑
j 6=iΓijxj
)
where ai > 0 is a pricing parameter, P 0 is the total power
target of the link, bi > 0, and Γ = [Γij ] is the link system
matrix, with parameters as in [39]. Each channel (agent) has
dynamics (14), where the disturbance is generated due to the
pilot-tones used for network tracing and monitoring, [13],
which take the form of a sinusoidal signal with a unique
frequency assigned for each channel and unknown modulation.
Thus di = P 0[1+mi sin(2pifit)], where mi = 0.1i (unknown
modulation index) and frequency fi = 10i kHz, i ∈ I. First,
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Fig. 3: Gradient-play dynamics (6) subject to disturbances
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Fig. 4: Agent dynamics Σi (23) subject to disturbances
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Fig. 5: Random communication graph, Gc, λ2 = 2.6158
we consider that each agent has full information about the
others’ actions and we compare the results of agent dynamics,
(23), with a standard gradient-play scheme (6). As seen in
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, (6) do not the reject disturbances (sustained
fluctuations in the OSNR values), while (23) successfully
reject disturbances and converge to the NE found in [39].
Next, assume each agent has partial information over a random
graph, Gc, Fig. 5. The results of dynamics (16) are plotted in
Fig. 7, while those of the Laplacian-based gradient dynamics
(7) are shown in Fig. 6, with similar comparison.
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Fig. 6: Laplacian-based dynamics (7) overGc
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Fig. 7: Agent dynamicsΣi (16) subject to disturbances overGc
B. Sensor Networks
Our next example is similar to the one investigated in
[14]. However, our algorithm uses a continuous-time gradient-
play inspired feedback instead of the discrete-time extremum
seeking algorithm used in [14]. It is also important to note
that while [14] considers noisy feedbacks, it does not consider
disturbance rejection as we have posed it here.
Consider a group of five mobile robots in the plane in
a sensor network. Each agent has a cost function that is a
function of all robots’ positions, (xi, x−i),
Ji(xi, x−i) = xTi xi + x
T
i ri +
∑
j∈I
‖xi − xj‖2 (36)
where r1 = col(2,−2), r2 = col(−2,−2), r3 = col(−4, 2),
r4 = col(2,−4), and r5 = col(3, 3). We consider two types,
velocity actuated and force-actuated robots, and in each case
we consider the full-information and the partial-information
case with communication over a random graph, Gc (Fig. ??).
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Fig. 8: Random Communication Graph, Gc
1) Velocity-Actuated Robots: Consider that each agent in
the network is a velocity-actuated robot with dynamics given
by (14), where di = col(0.5, 0) is a constant disturbance.
We consider first that each agent has full information about
the other’s actions and compare our algorithm (23) to the
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Fig. 9: Comparison of (23) and (6) for single-integrator agents
standard gradient-play (6). In Fig. 9 solid-lines depict gradient-
play results in the disturbance-free case. In the presence of
disturbances, as seen in Fig. 9, (23) (dashed-lines) converges to
the same NE values, while the standard gradient-play (dotted-
lines) does not. Next consider that each agent only has partial-
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Fig. 10: Comparison of (16) & (7) for single-integrator agents
information communicated over a graph, Gc. We compare
our algorithm (16) to that of the Laplacian based-gradient
dynamics (7) in Fig. 10, where solid-lines depict (7) results
in the disturbance-free case. In the presence of disturbances,
Fig. 10 shows that (16) (dashed-lines) converges to the same
NE values as found by the full-information case, Fig. 9, while
(7) (dotted-lines) does not.
2) Force-Actuated Robots: Consider that each agent is
modelled as double integrator, (24) where di = col(0.5, 0).
The corresponding results are shown in Fig. 11 (full informa-
tion case) and Fig. 12 (partial-information over Gc), where
dashed-lines correspond to (34) and (28), respectively, while
dotted-lines to the disturbance-free learning algorithm.
Remark 7: Although we did not specifically investigate
systems with noisy feedbacks, it is possible to show that due
to their ISS properties, the dynamics (16) and (28) have a
certain amount of robustness to feedback noise, such as the
type investigated in [14] and [16]. The ISS property implies
that for any bounded feedback noise, the steady-state solution
will remain in a neighbourhood of the NE.
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Fig. 11: Results of (34) for double-integrator agents
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Fig. 12: Results of (28) for double-integrator agents
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We considered Nash equilibrium seeking schemes for
(multi)-integrator agents subject to external disturbances. We
addressed the case of full information on the others’ decisions,
as well as the case where agents have partial-decision informa-
tion, based on local observation and communication. In both
cases, we proposed new continuous-time dynamic schemes
that converge to the Nash equilibrium, irrespective of the
disturbance. Besides a gradient-play component, the proposed
agent dynamics have a dynamic internal-model component,
and, in the case of partial-information, a consensus component
that drives agents to reach the decision-estimate consensus
subspace.
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